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SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2029
TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [KZ](#) [UP](#) [BO](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-VII GUIDANCE-004

REF: A. GENEVA 943 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-002)
[1](#)B. GENEVA 957 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-004)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary, VCI.
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

Nuclear Armaments for Heavy Bombers

1.(S) Background: In Ref A, Delegation recommended that the U.S. modify its original proposal on nuclear armaments for heavy bombers by adding a requirement for each side to declare, store in a central storage facility, and permit the inspection of, non-deployed long-range nuclear ALCMs (LRNA) (or their airframes considered to contain LRNA). However, the Russian side has been consistent in voicing its strong opposition to permitting inspection in its weapons storage areas, which is the key element of both the original U.S. position on nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, and the delegation's proposed modification. Russia has instead proposed an attribution rule for heavy bomber nuclear armaments, suggesting that each heavy bomber be attributed with one nuclear weapon, but making clear that Russia was open to considering a different attribution should the United States wish to propose one.

[1](#)2. (S) Guidance: As tactically appropriate, delegation is instructed to inform the Russian delegation that Washington is prepared to accept an attribution rule for nuclear armaments associated with heavy bombers on the conditions that the attribution for each deployed heavy bomber is three nuclear armaments, and that three heavy bombers can be selected and inspected during each category one inspection conducted at a heavy bomber base.

Inspection Issues

[1](#)3. (S) Guidance: As tactically appropriate, delegation is authorized to make the proposals described in paragraphs 4-5 below in return for Russian acceptance of the U.S. proposal that each party be permitted up to twelve Type 1 and eight type 2 inspections each year.

[1](#)4. (S) In exchange for Russian agreement to 20 inspections as described in paragraph 3, Washington concurs with the Delegation's recommendation in Ref B to offer that one launcher that contains a deployed ICBM or SLBM be designated for a nuclear warhead inspection (NWI), provided inspectors are also granted the right to

designate and inspect one ICBM or SLBM launcher that is empty. Delegation should ensure that the treaty or its protocol makes it clear that a launcher declared to be "empty" means a launcher that does not contain a missile. A launcher that contains a missile without a front section, or a missile with zero warheads on it, would be declared as a deployed ICBM or SLBM having zero warheads deployed on it. The ICBM or SLBM launcher selected for confirmation that it is empty need not be from the same SLBM or from the same flight of ICBMs that is selected for the warhead inspection.

15. (S) Also in the context of Russian agreement to 20 inspections as described in paragraph 3, delegation is further authorized to agree that two inspections may be conducted at no more than four facilities during a year.

Mobile ICBM Elimination

16. (S) Guidance: As tactically appropriate, delegation is authorized to drop the right of inspectors to be present during the final elimination procedure for the elimination of the first stage of a mobile ICBM provided that inspectors are able to confirm both the unique identifier associated with the missile and its associated launch canister, and that the procedures permit inspectors to confirm visually that the missile has, in fact, been eliminated in an inspection of the eliminated missile that can be conducted following the completion of the elimination procedures.

MOU DATA

17. (S) Washington concurs with the delegation recommendation, provided via email, to populate the MOU at the time of treaty signature with the most recent START MOU data (which will be six months old), provided Russia agrees with an obligation for each party to update that data within 45 days after signature.

18. (S) With respect to the Russian concern, reported by the delegation via email, on reporting warhead data in the MOU, delegation is instructed first to note that warhead data can only be exchanged after Treaty entry into force. Furthermore, Delegation is authorized to agree with the Russian proposal that the MOU contain only aggregate warhead data for each base (rather than warhead data for each individual missile), on the condition that Russia agree to the releasability of the MOU data similar to the procedures used under START for MOU data releasability.
End Guidance.
CLINTON